Talk:Metaphysical naturalism

Biased. At least give a hint for the replies to objections. Jeez. This counts as a B? I'd give it a C. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.111.214.139 (talk) 05:01, 16 June 2008 (UTC)

I suggest the bibliography be limited to books that actually argue for naturalism more or less as a complete worldview, and not be filled with books that merely pertain to naturalism or defend only one part of a naturalist worldview (which are legion).

I suggest the list of names after "prominent defenders of metaphysical naturalism as a complete worldview" be limited to persons who meet all three of the following criteria:

1. Person wrote one or more books that singly or together argue for metaphysical naturalism as a complete worldview, rather than only writing on one or another aspect of the naturalist worldview.
2. Person is still alive and actively publishing on the subject.
3. Person is prominent enough to have a Wikipedia entry.

These were the criteria I employed when I composed the original draft for Wikipedia. No one has deviated from them as of yet, so I include them here only for the benefit of future editors. If anyone suggests changing these criteria, I suggest they also be willing to undertake the burden of adding those persons and books that meet the new criteria and otherwise warrant inclusion.

RichardCarrier 01:48, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

What a surprise that Carrier wants criteria that are sure to include his on a short list. Arrogant @#$. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.111.214.139 (talk) 05:02, 16 June 2008 (UTC)

First, all mental contents (such as ideas, theories, emotions, moral and personal values, or beauty and ugliness) exist solely as the computational constructions of our brain, and not as things that exist independently of us.

- I understand the above sentence is more of a proposition in a naturalistic statement of faith, but some sort of citation of evidence would be helpful. After all, such a proposition swims upstream against the river of intuition. (The reality of personal, private thought is one reason why I reject naturalism.)

66.143.45.146 15:35, 9 June 2006 (UTC)

As I understand it, naturalism doesn't just rule out the supernaturtal, but also the un-natural and non-natural. I believe, that naturalism rules out things like universals as well, and that these are not generally considered "supernatural". Does anyone have any comment to make? I have made a similar remark on the naturalism discussion page. 86.134.41.134 04:13, 14 July 2006 (UTC)

I'll comment that all the things you just mentioned, as well as most of the article, are completely circular as definitions of naturalism. Is there just an arbitrary list of things which naturalists define as supernatural and reject, or is there actually some logical basis for it? If so, that needs to be refelcted in the article. 212.9.22.229 10:24, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Just the things that science cannot explain?

I came across this article and having decided that metaphysical naturalism applies to my beliefs, I was amazed at the inconsistancies that came about between my naturalist philosophy and what this article implied were my beliefs. I was first taken aback by the constant reference to naturalistic metaphysics in terms of "mindlessness". whether one believes that everything is natural or not has nothing inherantly to do with mindlessness, nor does it have anything at all to do with your belief in God. the idea that God is supernatural is only a result of abrahamic religious bias, as many religions and philosophies of belief regard God in a very similar way to nature itself. God could be easily seen as the totality of nature, but insistance on the western ideas of intelligent design and creationism creates bias in this article that seem to contradict this notion. I am not placing a NPOV on this article, as this idea is symptomatic of centuries of exclusively abrahimic study of religion, but this article should be extensively edited in order to provide a more worldwide view of metaphysical naturalism in a more inclusive theoretical context. Flying Hamster 21:47, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Indeed, the definition section contains an error caused by the mind bias; namely the falsity of MN does not entail "some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature". MN would be false simply if, say, prayer worked or seven-league boots existed. I may change this section unless credible reasons for requiring mind effects are forthcoming. TobyK 01:15, 13 July 2007 (UTC)

While the arguments for metaphysical naturalism are written as proven fact and contain full paragraphs, the arguments against are one or two sentences long, are incomplete descriptions, and are presented as dubious. I propose to expand and elaborate on the arguments against section. —Preceding unsigned comment added by PraetorDrew (talk • contribs) 11:55, 26 March 2009 (UTC)

The Arguments Against Naturalism section needs a bit of a cleanup methinks. Only the main arguments need go up, we dont need silly things such as "Argument from reason" or "Argument from incoherence". --void main 15:14, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Argement from reason is an important argument eta: Husserl's anti-psychologism was about the possibility of logic.

Reference for supernatural: Oxford companion to philosophy: Naturalism Eta: Sorry for all the edits Eta2: Should wikipedia really draw so much attention to (and rely on) the debate between two authors, neither of which seem to have even masters in philosophy?! I would have guessed that neither has nor can answer the question. No offense like.

It seems that this section of the article turns out to actually be more like 'arguments for naturalism.' A lot of the con arguments do not seem to represent the best arguments possible against naturalism. Some, in fact, seem like straw men. I think it is best to show the naturalist reply to criticism, yet I also think that the way the article stands makes it seem as though naturalism is obviously the best position to take. This may be the case, but I don't think an encyclopedic article, being informative rather than persuasive, should take this route.

I entirely agree. The "argument from incoherence" just serves as a link refuting such argument, not giving a tenable example of one. I could probably make one just from scaning over the page, but that would be original research. Such as in the "argument from miricles" it states; But, naturalists argue, in every case where these claims became accessible to empirical inquiry they failed to be confirmed or were even refuted. the link given for the critique by Richard C. Carrier tries to separate the foundation of "scientism" from "naturalism" as the basis of the argument by Michael Rea, but it doesn't separate "empiricalism" from "naturalism", in fact, it seems to equate them specifically. Which ultimately seems as if it would make all of the inconsistences of Rea continue to stand true.

For example the line where it has the example that points to the worlds presented in the movies Ghost Busters and Star Wars. In the former, Dan Akroyd's character "could measure the ghost 'residue' and make successful predictions of ghost activity," and in the latter "the Jedi knights could learn ... how to use 'the Force'" which was comparable to a "technology," and "by being able to repeat demonstrations of the Force," they "could at least in theory have tried to figure out how and why it worked the way it does" and that is, quite simply, "science." Yet neither world would be one naturalists could believe in and still call themselves 'naturalists' in any intelligible way. Here he tries to separate science & naturalism, but clearly these are showing science by example of empiricalism, which he goes on to equate the basis of naturalism to. Nagelfar 00:28, 28 April 2007 (UTC)

Does a person that is only made of matter really have any free will? 70.20.234.188 19:47, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

It depends on your point of view. Metaphysical naturalism offers this explanation. --Ioeth 19:49, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

This comment is in reference to the section Argument to naturalism as best explanation.

To me, the wording in this section (i.e. "God" with a capital "G") seems to be focusing on a naturalistic argument specifically against Abrahamic religions rather than against all supernaturalistic worldviews in general. I think that it might be good to re-word this section a bit so that metaphysical naturalism as a best explanation is not just an argument against Abrahamic religions. It's probably not a bad idea to check the rest of the article for this sort of neutrality either, although nothing else stuck out in my mind.

This is not to say that "God" can not or should not be referenced within the article. For instance, the section Arguments against naturalism uses the popular idea of "God" as a means to better define the naturalist worldview.

Any thoughts, or should I do a little rewriting? --Ioeth 07:26, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Sounds good to me. Gabrielthursday 17:09, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Here's my proposed rewrite:

Some naturalists argue that sound naturalist hypotheses about facts still scientifically unexplained outperform all other hypotheses in explanatory scope and power, relative to explanatory simplicity. If that's true, then metaphysical naturalism is the best explanation of everything we observe and experience, and is therefore probably true. This amounts to arguing that everything makes more sense if naturalism is true, many details about ourselves and the world are more probable if naturalism is true, and to explain even the most mysterious of facts naturalism has to resort to fewer ad hoc assumptions than any known alternative. For example, resorting to the supernatural as explanation typically requires an array of completely ad hoc assumptions about the abilities, nature, limitations, and desires of supernatural forces. Even so, much of what remains unexplained is then elucidated as simply the "mystery" of the enigmatic will of the supernatural or as beyond human ken. Naturalism, on the other hand, relies much more heavily on assumptions already scientifically established as precedents and principles, and makes more specific predictions about what the observed results would be if naturalism were true, which align very well with actual observations.

Opinions? --Ioeth 19:40, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

I reverted a change that shoeofdeath made. If he has a problem with it, I suggest he talk to me about it :roll:

Anyone have a better name for the subsection "Ancient Period"? Sanjat312

I changed the diambiguation page. As such I think both articles are wrong headed. I suggest leading out the arguments page until someone reads something written by someone with some qualifications ;)

Ricard Carrier has written this entry AND recommended his book/work in it! I think it needs to be rewrtten for thsi reason alone! Also, I don't think the arguments against section is neutral: most end in claims that the argument is incorrect, surely there is some academic disagreement as to whether e.g. the existence of qualia undermines naturalism? And why demand scientific evidence for supernatural causes, surely this is impossible as what was considered supernatural would then be natural?

In common with many of Wikipedia's philosophy pages, this article contains many assertions without cites which could be construed as original research / author's POV. IMHO, the section "Common beliefs" is particularly questionable here. (For what it's worth, I do share most of these beliefs myself -- I just want the assertions to be backed up with something.) Wikipedia:Citing sources, Wikipedia:No original research --Writtenonsand 17:06, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

In the section "Common beliefs", "Primacy of happiness" strikes me as an item which is not obviously relevant here. Any discussion pro/con? -- Writtenonsand 17:12, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

Removing it as no-one has produced a compelling reason to include it here.--99.225.147.4 (talk) 05:14, 12 December 2008 (UTC)

Isn't section 2 leaning rather heavily on a single reference? --99.225.147.4 (talk) 05:22, 12 December 2008 (UTC)

I just added comments on the Evolutionary argument against naturalism section, as the counterpoint of naturalists was not mentioned. my major source for this was Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion. i apologise for not citing it or the lack of "quality standards" in my typed response, as i am ignorant of these procedures and unfortunately limited for time. i apologise also for the laziness and haste of my contribution, but i do hope someone better qualified can add these explanations/counterpoints in any relevant topics, including the main article on "Evolutionary argument against naturalism" if they are not present there.--Avidya 5:52 7 April 2007 (UTC)

In the very end of the definition section: "but not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists." why?

My proposed rewrite of this article is as follows:

Metaphysical naturalism

1.0 Definition 2.0 History

2.1  Ancient period
2.2  Middle Ages to modernity
2.3  Marxism, Objectivism, and secular humanism

3.0 Common beliefs

3.1  Undesigned universe
3.2  Unplanned life
3.3  Evolution
3.4  Brain as Mind
3.5  Utility of reason
3.6  Value of society

4.0 Arguments for naturalism

4.1  Argument from precedent
4.2  Argument for naturalism as best explanation
4.3  Argument from absence
4.4  Argument from physical minds
4.5  Argument from the implausibility of alternatives

5.0 Arguments against naturalism

5.1  Argument from despair
5.2  Argument from religious experience
5.3  Argument from miracles
5.4  Argument from the necessity of God
5.5  Argument to cosmological design
5.6  Argument to biological design
5.7  Argument from consciousness
5.8  Argument from reason 
5.9  Argument from physical law
5.10 Argument from incoherence
5.11 Moral argument

Metaphysical naturalism is any worldview in which the world is amenable to a unified study that includes the natural sciences and in this sense the world is a unity. According to such a view, nature is all there is, and all things supernatural (which stipulatively includes spirits and souls, non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) do not exist. It is often simply referred to as naturalism, and occasionally as philosophical naturalism or ontological naturalism, though all those terms have other meanings as well, with naturalism often referring to methodological naturalism. This article presents only a basic outline of the definition and history of metaphysical naturalism and the major arguments for and against it.

1.0 Definition

Metaphysical naturalism is most commonly distinguished from methodological naturalism which refers to the long standing convention in science of the scientific method, which makes the methodological assumption that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes, without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural, and so considers supernatural explanations for such events to be outside science. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with what exists beyond what has already been established by science, so metaphysical naturalism refers to a belief about the totality of what exists. Methodology, however, is only the means by which knowledge is acquired. Thus, metaphysical naturalism entails the belief that nature is in fact all that exists, while methodological naturalism entails the belief that for one reason or another empirical methods will only ascertain natural facts, whether supernatural facts exist or not.The concept of "nature" embraced by contemporary metaphysical naturalists excludes by definition gods, spirits, and any other supernatural beings, objects, or forces. There are many different varieties of metaphysical naturalism, but all can be separated into two general categories, physicalism and pluralism. Physicalism entails the claim that everything everyone has observed or claimed to observe is in actual fact the product of fundamentally mindless arrangements or interactions of matter-energy in space-time, and therefore it is unreasonable to believe anything else exists. Pluralism, which includes dualism, adds to this the existence of fundamentally mindless things besides matter-energy in space-time; ie. reified abstract objects. What all metaphysical naturalists agree on, however, is that the fundamental constituents of reality, from which everything derives and upon which everything depends, are fundamentally mindless. So if any variety of metaphysical naturalism is true, then any mental properties that exist (hence any mental powers or beings) are causally derived from, and ontologically dependent on, systems of nonmental properties, powers, or things. This means metaphysical naturalism would be false if any distinctly mental property, power, or entity exists that is not ontologically dependent on some arrangement of nonmental things, or that is not causally derived from some arrangement of nonmental things, or that has causal effects without the involvement of any arrangement of nonmental things that is already causally sufficient to produce that effect. In lay terms, if metaphysical naturalism is true, then all minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely constructed from or caused by natural phenomena; if metaphysical naturalism is false, then some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature (either they partly or wholly cause themselves, or they exist or operate fundamentally on their own). Belief in the latter entails some form of supernaturalism (the opposite of naturalism), which is not limited to supernatural beings, but can encompass mindless things with distinctly mental properties, like magical objects (see magic and incantation) or causally efficacious Platonic forms or the existence of love as a cosmic force. Finally, it should be noted that the relationship between metaphysical and methodological naturalism is not one-dimensional and varies among individual thinkers. To understand this relationship, two varieties of methodological naturalism should be distinguished. Absolute methodological naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural facts, even if there are some; this is compatible with (but does not entail) the view that something other than empirical methods might be able to discover supernatural facts. Contingent methodological naturalism entails the belief that, judging from past experience, empirical methods are far more likely to uncover natural facts than supernatural ones, so that it is generally an ill-advised waste of resources to pursue supernatural hypotheses, but it would not be impossible to confirm them empirically if any were true. With all this understood, every metaphysical naturalist will be either a contingent methodological naturalist or an absolute methodological naturalist, but not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists.

2.0 History

2.1 Ancient period

Metaphysical naturalism appears to have originated in early Greek philosophy. The earliest presocratic philosophers, such as Thales, Anaxagoras or most especially Democritus, were labeled by their peers and successors "the physikoi" (from the Greek φυσικός or physikos, meaning "natural philosopher," borrowing on the word φύσις or physis, meaning "nature") because they sought to explain everything by reference to natural causes alone, often distinctly excluding any role for gods, spirits or magic in the creation or operation of the world. This eventually led to fully developed systems such as Epicureanism, which sought to explain everything that exists as the product of atoms moving in a void, or the advanced Aristotelianism of Strato of Lampsacus, which sought to explain everything that exists as the inevitable outcome of uncreated natural forces or tendencies. In their definition of nature, the ancient Greeks distinguished "nature" from "artifice." Anything that resulted from the innate properties of a thing was regarded as having a natural cause, regardless of whether those properties themselves were intelligently arranged or not, while anything that resulted from intelligent action was regarded as having an artificial cause, regardless of whether the intelligence itself was the product of natural causes. Thus, natural causes were partially distinguished from intelligent causes. It was often assumed that some intelligent causes were primary causes and not solely the product of natural properties, but not everyone agreed. Following the physikoi and their successors, some ancient intellectuals denied the existence of any intelligent causes that were not entirely the product of natural causes (thus reducing all intelligent causes to natural causes), and they represent the earliest metaphysical naturalists.However, only a few Greek and Roman intellectuals embraced such a view, though of those few, Epicurus and Strato of Lampsacus were the most famous. Metaphysical naturalism is most notably a Western phenomenon, but an equivalent idea has long existed in the East. Though unnamed and never articulated into a coherent system, one tradition within Confucian philosophy embraced a view that can correctly be called metaphysical naturalism, dating back at least to Wang Ch'ung in the 1st century, if not earlier. But this tradition arose independently and had little influence on the development of modern naturalist philosophy or on Eastern or Western culture.

2.2  Middle Ages to modernity

With the rise and dominance of Christianity and the decline of secular philosophy in the West, metaphysical naturalism became heretical and eventually illegal, thus making it difficult to document the history of metaphysical naturalism in the Middle Ages. When the Renaissance reintroduced numerous lost treatises by Greek and Roman natural philosophers, many of the ideas and concepts of naturalism were picked up again, contributing to a new Scientific Revolution that would greatly advance the study and understanding of nature. But social and legal hostility continued to prevent advocates of metaphysical naturalism from coming forward, if there were any, until the political advances of the Age of Enlightenment made genuine free speech possible. Then a few intellectuals publicly renewed the case for metaphysical naturalism, like Baron d'Holbach in the 18th century. In this period, metaphysical naturalism finally acquired a distinct name, materialism, which became the only category of metaphysical naturalism widely defended until the 20th century, when advances in physics as well as philosophy made the original premise of materialism untenable. In physics, matter was found to be a form of energy and therefore not the fundamental constituent of reality as materialists had been presuming. In philosophy, renewed attention to the problem of universals and other undeniable but "immaterial" realities, further called materialism into question. These developments refined naturalism into the two forms now widely advanced (physicalism and naturalist pluralism, as explained above), both corresponding more closely to the system historians believe was articulated by Strato, rather than the system advanced by Epicurus as is commonly thought. Currently, metaphysical naturalism is more widely embraced than ever before, especially but not exclusively in the scientific community, where acquaintance with the facts of nature is broader and more secure, though metaphysical naturalism is still a minority worldview. The vast majority of the population of the world remains firmly committed to supernaturalist worldviews. However, it is likely that a substantial minority or even a majority of the population in certain European and other first world countries might embrace metaphysical naturalism in some basic, unarticulated sense.To date, nothing that is not physical has ever been discovered, and so metaphysical naturalism remains a valid position based upon what is currently known. Today, noteworthy proponents are too numerous to count, but prominent defenders of metaphysical naturalism as a complete worldview include Mario Bunge, Richard Carrier, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and David Mills.

2.3  Marxism, Objectivism, and secular humanism

As a final note to the history of metaphysical naturalism, certain extreme varieties of politicized naturalism have arisen in the West, most notably Marxism in the 19th century and Objectivism in the 20th century. Marxism is an expression of communist or socialist ideals in a naturalist framework, while Objectivism is the exact opposite, an expression of capitalist ideals in a naturalist framework. However, today most advocates of metaphysical naturalism in first world countries reject both extremes and embrace the more moderate political ideals of secular humanism.

3.0 Common beliefs

Contemporary naturalists possess a wide diversity of beliefs and engage each other in healthy debate and disagreement on many issues. However, besides the basic beliefs already described above, most if not all contemporary naturalists believe the following, as a consequence of applying the core beliefs of naturalism to the findings of the sciences and their own personal experience.

3.1  Undesigned universe

The universe has either always existed or had a purely natural origin, being neither created nor designed. Either way, naturalists hold nature (rather than, say, God or Tao) to be the eternal ground of all being. Big Bang theory is now well-established and entails the observable universe had a beginning, unfolding from a process of natural laws, but this does not entail anything about what existed before, and thus does not resolve the question of whether all that exists began to exist or whether something of some sort has always existed, so most naturalists remain open to either hypothesis. Though it is neither required nor universally embraced by naturalists, multiverse theory is particularly popular now, as scientific advances have substantially increased the likelihood that the observable universe is only part of a much larger whole, and the explanatory power and relative simplicity of current multiverse cosmologies is remarkable. Another idea that has been put forth by naturalists is that energy, the source of matter, has always existed. They cite the first law of thermodynamics as a basis for this. It is often emphasized by naturalists of this position that energy, not the universe in its current state, exists eternally.

3.2   Unplanned life

Life is an unplanned product of blind natural processes. In our case, this meant the combination of a chain of chemicals called amino acids, into a pattern that was automatically self-replicating (possibly as autocatalytic RNA or PNA), in a sheltered but energy-rich environment. The extreme improbability of such a combination has ensured that life is extremely rare. However, though life is indeed rare, the observable universe is so incredibly old and large that even very improbable events are virtually guaranteed to happen a few times within it, and life on earth is one of those nearly inevitable outcomes. Our existence is therefore seen as lucky rather than planned or intended, and most naturalists call upon everyone to appreciate and make the best of their good fortune rather than devaluing or squandering it. Some scientific theories as to the origin of life are abiogenesis and panspermia, among other things.

3.3  Evolution

Evolution by natural selection is a staple of the naturalist worldview, perceived as a well-established scientific explanation for the rise and diversity of life on earth, which developed slowly and imperfectly over an extremely long period of time. Thus, our own existence as conscious animals of superior intelligence and sagacity, is explained not as the outcome of intelligent design nor as a mere accidental combination of chemicals (such as originated life), but as the product of a dynamic system that generates highly complex order on its own, without any guidance. Since this entails that the properties of living organisms like ourselves have been selected not according to a compassionate or prescient engineer, but solely according to their differential reproductive success, naturalists interpret cells, organs and species as having a "purpose" or "function" in terms of their ability to increase differential reproductive success, but do not perceive in this any moral goal that should be emulated or furthered, since nature is the cause, and nature has no compassion or plan. However, this does not exclude the possibility of true moral propositions derived from evolved facts.

3.4  Brain as Mind

Human beings have no independent soul or spirit, but only a material brain, which operates to produce a conscious mind. Since our mind, and hence our identity and existence as persons, is entirely the product of a physical process, three conclusions follow. First, all mental contents (such as ideas, theories, emotions, moral and personal values, or beauty and ugliness) exist solely as the computational constructions of our brain, and not as things that exist independently of us. Second, damage to the brain (from disease, drugs, malnutrition, or injury) frequently entails damage to the self and therefore should be of great concern. Third, the death or destruction of our brain cannot be survived, and therefore all humans are mortal. That means, given present technology, death is inevitable and entails our complete extinction. Since this entails there is no present hope of an afterlife, naturalists argue humans need to accept this and make the most of what they have.

3.5  Utility of reason

Reason is the refinement and improvement of naturally evolved faculties, through discovering, then learning, and then employing methods and procedures that are found to increase the frequency with which we arrive at true conclusions and correct information about ourselves and the world. Naturalists thus believe that reason is superior to all the other tools available to us in ascertaining the truth, so anyone who wishes to have more beliefs that are true than are false should seek to perfect and consistently employ their reason in testing and forming beliefs.One outcome of this principle has been the discovery that empirical methods (especially those of proven use in the sciences) are unsurpassed for discovering the facts of reality, while methods of pure reason alone can securely discover only truths inherent in concepts and systems of ideas.

3.6  Value of society

Humans evolved as social animals, which is the only reason we have developed culture and civilization, and now in fact depend on them. This means that even in the neutral terms of differential reproductive success, as a species our future depends on developing and maintaining a healthy and productive culture and civilization, and any behavior contrary to that end threatens our survival as a species.

4.0 Arguments for naturalism

There are many arguments for metaphysical naturalism. Only a few will be surveyed here, and only in brief. There are many others, but most involve refinements, variants or sub-arguments to the following.

4.1  Argument from precedent

For over three hundred years empirical methods have consistently discovered only natural things and causes, even underlying many things once thought to be supernatural. Meanwhile, no other methods have produced any consistent conclusions about the substance or causes of anything, much less anything supernatural. The logical inference is that since countless past gaps in knowledge have been filled by naturalism, and by nothing else, probably all remaining gaps in knowledge will be filled by naturalism as well. This simply extends a principle fundamental to science as a whole, that we should presume any new phenomenon obeys known laws of physics until we have empirically proven otherwise. Hence we should presume that any unexplained fact has a natural explanation until we have empirically proven otherwise. Therefore, since we have not found empirical proof of anything supernatural, and since we have abundant reason from past precedent to expect that natural explanations underlie everything, metaphysical naturalism is most probably true.

4.2  Argument for naturalism as best explanation

Some naturalists argue that sound naturalist hypotheses about facts still scientifically unexplained outperform all other hypotheses in explanatory scope and power, relative to explanatory simplicity. If that's true, then metaphysical naturalism is the best explanation of everything we observe and experience, and is therefore probably true. This amounts to arguing that everything makes more sense if naturalism is true, many details about ourselves and the world are more probable if naturalism is true, and to explain even the most mysterious of facts naturalism has to resort to fewer ad hoc assumptions than any known alternative. For example, resorting to the supernatural as explanation typically requires an array of completely ad hoc assumptions about the abilities, nature, limitations, and desires of supernatural forces. Even so, much of what remains unexplained is then elucidated as simply the "mystery" of the enigmatic will of the supernatural or as beyond human ken. Naturalism, on the other hand, relies much more heavily on assumptions already scientifically established as precedents and principles, and makes more specific predictions about what the observed results would be if naturalism were true, which align very well with actual observations.

4.3  Argument from absence

One major way in which naturalism explains things better than alternatives is that if the supernatural exists (whether as gods, powers, or spirits), it is so silent and inert that its effects are almost never observed, despite vast and extensive searching. Even the relatively few alleged observations take place only under dubious conditions lacking in sound empirical controls or tests, and on those occasions when they are subsequently subjected to sound controls or tests, they turn out to be false. Our inability to uncover clear evidence of anything supernatural is somewhat improbable if anything supernatural exists, but very probable if nothing supernatural exists, and therefore metaphysical naturalism is probably true.

4.4  Argument from physical minds

Scientists have accumulated vast evidence that the human mind is a product of a functioning brain, which is entirely constructed from different interacting physical systems that evolved over time through the animal kingdom, and that our brain is now the most complex machine found anywhere in nature, and that our minds appear limited to our brain's physical needs and capabilities. We have discovered no clear evidence of any other kind of mind, nor any clear evidence that our minds can exceed the limitations of our physical brain, nor any clear evidence that our brains did not slowly evolve through billions 4.of years of natural selection. This is the only way we would observe the facts to be if naturalism were true (since there is no other way to have a mind on naturalism except as the product of a slowly evolved, highly complex physical system like our brain), but if supernaturalism were true (and therefore some minds or mental content exist independently of a physical machine like our brain), what we observe is not the only way things could be (since by now we could have and likely would have observed some supernatural elements of our or other minds or observed mental powers in other things). Since this observation is less probable if supernaturalism is true, metaphysical naturalism is more likely to be true.

4.5  Argument from the implausibility of alternatives

Finally, joining the first two arguments to the rest, we have an argument from implausibility. The only supernatural hypothesis that does not fall to any of the above arguments is a hypothesis wherein the proposed supernatural entity or ability is so rare, so obscure, so inert, so unrelated to human experience, and so strange and complex as to entail exactly the same observations already entailed by naturalism, that there is no reasonable argument to be made for believing it. Occam's razor is invoked .In the absence of any reasonable argument to believe anything supernatural exists or explains anything, and in the presence of some reasonable arguments to believe the natural world exists and explains everything, metaphysical naturalism should be accepted until disproved.

5.0 Arguments against naturalism

In much the same way that theology consists largely of working out which theories of divinity are plausible and coherent (and which are not), so naturalist philosophy consists largely of working out which naturalist worldviews are plausible and coherent (and which are not). Consequently, attacking inept constructions of naturalism or caricatures of naturalism is akin to attacking inept theologies or caricatures of theology. Just as critics of the existence of God need to address the most carefully constructed and best defended theologies, critics of naturalism need to address the most carefully constructed and best defended naturalist worldviews., Metaphysical naturalism has no lack of critics. It has been loathed by countless defenders of supernatural worldviews for thousands of years and has been subject to countless attacks. Most of these attacks consist of obviously fallacious or ineffective criticism or empty rhetoric. But some arguments present significant though not insurmountable challenges to naturalist philosophy. Only those arguments will be briefly surveyed here.

5.1 Argument from despair

The most commonly voiced argument against naturalism is that it leads to human despair. There are many forms of this argument. Some emphasize the fact that naturalism entails there is no cosmic meaning of life, others propose that a religion promising eternal salvation is a safer bet (as in Pascal's Wager), while others claim naturalism entails the elimination of free will, which allegedly entails there is no knowledge, hope or moral responsibility. A common Naturalist answer to these arguments is that they only argue for what someone wants to be true, not what actually is true. Naturalists further respond that humans define their own meaning in life, that life contains too much potential happiness to warrant despair, and that naturalism does not eliminate free will in any sense that eliminates knowledge, hope, or moral responsibility.

5.2  Argument from religious experience

Many people claim to have seen, felt, or talked to God or any number of other spirits, and claim these experiences refute naturalism. Naturalists respond that religious experiences routinely (and often radically) contradict each other, and therefore most must be false, and if most are false, then all could be. Naturalists also observe that these experiences never reveal more than the cultural and psychological knowledge and assumptions of the experiencer, suggesting they originate entirely in the experiencer's own mind. At the same time, these experiences have scientifically known causes in human biology and psychology. Naturalists argue that for all these reasons, naturalism actually explains the content, diversity and limitations of religious experience better than supernaturalism does.

5.3  Argument from miracles

Often some miracle is offered as evidence refuting naturalism, including alleged cases of supernatural healing, fulfilled prophetic or psychic predictions, or the supposed impossibility of composing some book (like the Bible or the Koran) without divine aid. Naturalists respond that none of these claims have ever survived empirical inquiry. Most are inaccessible to such inquiry and thus amount to mere assertions rather than actual evidence against naturalism. But, naturalists argue, in every case where these claims became accessible to empirical inquiry they failed to be confirmed or were even refuted. In fact, naturalists argue, this very failure to confirm any miracle claims, despite centuries of trying, is better explained by naturalism than supernaturalism.

5.4  Argument from the necessity of God

One of the more esoteric arguments against naturalism is to claim that it is in some sense impossible for the universe to exist unless it is caused or cohabited by a supernatural person. There are several forms of this argument, some requiring a demonstration of the premise that the universe began to exist (like the Kalam cosmological argument), which, naturalists argue, cannot be demonstrated, since contemporary Big Bang theory no longer entails time began, and arguments from the alleged impossibility of infinite series fail to include a formal logical proof of that impossibility. Naturalists respond to this and other forms (like the ontological argument) that no sound argument has yet been presented that follows from demonstrably true premises to the conclusion that a supernatural person must exist.

5.5  Argument to cosmological design

Also known as the Fine Tuning argument, this is the claim that the fundamental constants of physics appear so finely-tuned to permit life that only a supernatural engineer can explain it. Naturalists respond that even apparent fine-tuning has yet to be scientifically demonstrated, and apparent fine-tuning does not entail actual fine-tuning and only actual fine-tuning argues against naturalism. Since the known and suspected interrelationships of the physical constants entails that altering one necessarily alters others, and no one has correctly worked out the consequences of any change, much less shown that it would result in a uniformly lethal universe, no one has yet demonstrated even the appearance of fine tuning. For example, altering the speed of light will likely alter the masses of all the fundamental particles, but we do not yet know to what degree such a change would have this effect, so we do not know what the actual consequences of changing the speed of light would be. It has also not been shown that a collapsing universe will not produce a new universe, yet many proposed alterations of the physical constants supposedly entail a collapsed universe. For this and many other reasons, naturalists note that multiverse theory is more scientifically plausible now than ever before, and yet consistently produces apparent fine tuning without any intelligent design. As far as we know this sort of universe is the only kind that we could ever find ourselves in if naturalism were true. Therefore, it is argued, naturalism actually explains the particular complexity of our cosmos better than supernaturalism does.

5.6   Argument to biological design

Recently popular is the claim that certain structures in evolved organisms are too complex to have evolved by natural selection and can only be explained as the result of intelligent design. Naturalists respond that this claim remains a mere assertion, since no one has ever scientifically demonstrated that such structures actually exist. For example, no one has performed the necessary gene sequencing and gene splicing experiments to confirm the hypothesis that removing or altering any piece of a particular structure will eliminate all function and thus prevent the structure from arising by natural selection. Hence confirmed examples of irreducible complexity have yet to be demonstrated, and only the demonstration of such a structure's existence would challenge naturalism.

5.7   Argument from consciousness

Since no one has yet explained the qualitative nature of conscious experience, otherwise known as qualia, some argue that naturalism is therefore refuted or should not be believed. Naturalists respond that all the arguments for naturalism (especially the argument from precedent and the argument to the best explanation) entail that whatever the explanation of qualia actually is, it is far more likely to be a natural explanation than a supernatural one, and therefore naturalism is still the most credible worldview. Naturalists also point out that no supernatural theory of qualia has been produced or verified, either, and therefore supernaturalism has also failed to explain this phenomenon. And in such a case, our best bet is to follow past precedent, which in cognitive science has been a consistent and remarkable trend of confirming physicalism in almost every other aspect of the study of mind. Science has already confirmed that qualia-production has identifiable locations in the brain and requires the expenditure of energy (oxygen and nutrients), two indications that qualia have a physical cause.

5.8   Argument from reason

Some have argued that certain features of human reason cannot be explained by naturalism. For example, it is claimed that naturalism cannot explain intentionality, mental causation, or the existence of logical laws or abstract objects. Naturalists respond that a naive formulation of naturalism might have this failing, but robust formulations actually explain the existence of these things better than supernaturalism does. This is a complex subject discussed in a Critical Review of Victor Reppert's Defense of the Argument from Reason by Richard Carrier (2004) to which Victor Reppert responds on his blog.

5.9  Argument from physical law

Some claim naturalism cannot explain the existence of physical laws. This argument takes many forms, but the two most common are the claim that the mathematical nature of physical laws entails a supernatural mind behind them, and the claim that naturalism can provide no ontological foundation for physical laws, requiring some supernatural power or being to realize and maintain them. Naturalists respond, again, that a naive formulation of naturalism might have this failing, but robust formulations actually explain the existence of these things better than supernaturalism does. To date, no one has proven that any mathematical laws don't simply describe a physical fact of the geometry of matter-energy in space-time, and such a correlation remains the most scientifically plausible foundation for those laws, so neither the existence of physical laws nor the applicability of mathematics in describing them presents a challenge to naturalism. On the general issues involved, see Fundamental Flaws in Mark Steiner's Challenge to Naturalism by Richard Carrier (2003), and for the best recent articulation of how the laws of physics simply are a necessary consequence of the physical arrangement of matter-energy in space-time, see Victor Stenger's The Comprehensible Cosmos: Where Do the Laws of Physics Come From? (2006; ISBN 1-59102-424-2).

5.10  Argument from incoherence

Sometimes it is claimed that naturalism entails self-contradictory commitments. Naturalists respond that a naive formulation of naturalism might have this failing, but robust formulations do not. For example, see Defending Naturalism as a Worldview: A Rebuttal to Michael Rea's World Without Design by Richard Carrier (2003)Another argument from incoherence involves the claim that metaphysical naturalism precludes all nonphysical data in its premise. Because metaphysical naturalism assumes that everything is physical, using physical data in support of it would constitute circular reasoning. At this point in the argument, the only data that could plausibly support metaphysical naturalism would be nonphysical data. Opponents then argue that any existence of such data would be a direct contradiction of metaphysical naturalism. Finally, it is concluded that metaphysical naturalism is a self-contradictory and logically broken worldview.

5.11  Moral argument

There are two kinds of moral argument: the claim that naturalism eliminates morality and the claim that moral facts exist that naturalism cannot explain. The first claim, that there can be no moral truth if naturalism is true, is a variety of the argument from despair already noted above, and naturalists respond in the same way here as there. In addition, naturalists argue we can derive moral propositions from actual facts about human needs and desires and the social and physical environment we inhabit. As to the second claim, naturalists respond that no one has ever demonstrated the actual existence of any moral facts that naturalism cannot explain.

alexselkirk1704@hotmail.com

How about no? lol 66.57.44.247 (talk) 08:33, 9 August 2008 (UTC)

I'd like to suggest the following rewrite, regrouping of common topics and clarification of the Definition section of the Article:

[edit] Sagan's concise definition

"The Cosmos is all there is, has ever been or ever will be."^[1] —Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs)

[edit] Metaphysical Naturalism

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with what exists beyond what has already been established by science, thus metaphysical naturalism refers to a belief about the totality of what exists, excluding by definition gods, spirits, and any other supernatural beings, objects, or forces. It is a belief that nature is all that exists and assumes that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes. Supernatural causes are not possible.

This particular definition rests in an ambiguity caused by the use of the term "supernatural" by Richard Carrier and other apologists for naturalism whereby this word indicates non-materially reducible entities (spiritual substances) rather than the traditional meaning (where a spiritual substance, if created, is encompassed within the natural world, though being a spiritual or immaterial substance). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs)

[edit] Distinguishing Metaphysical & Methodological Naturalism

Metaphysical naturalism is most commonly distinguished from methodological naturalism that refers to the long-standing convention in science of the scientific method making the assumption that observable events in nature are explained only by natural causes. It entails the belief that for one reason or another empirical methods will only ascertain natural facts. The supernatural is not explicitly denied, but supernatural explanations are considered outside of science.

In any case, knowledge is acquired only by means of Methodology. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs)

[edit] Relationship of Metaphysical & Methodological Naturalism

The relationship between metaphysical and methodological naturalism is not one-dimensional and varies among individual thinkers. To understand this relationship, two varieties of methodological naturalism should be distinguished. Absolute methodological naturalism is the view that it is in some sense impossible for any empirical method to discover supernatural facts, even if there are some. [This is compatible with (but does not entail) the view that something other than empirical methods might be able to discover supernatural facts.] Contingent methodological naturalism entails the belief that, judging from past experience, empirical methods are far more likely to uncover natural facts than supernatural ones. It is generally an ill-advised waste of resources to pursue supernatural hypotheses, but it would not be impossible to confirm them empirically if any were true. Thus not all methodological naturalists will be metaphysical naturalists. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs)

[edit] Physicalism & Pluralism

There are many different varieties of metaphysical naturalism, but all can be separated into two general categories, physicalism and pluralism. Physicalism entails the claim that everything everyone has observed or claimed to observe is actually the product of fundamentally mindless arrangements or interactions of matter-energy in space-time, and therefore it is unreasonable to believe anything else exists. Pluralism (which includes dualism) adds to this the existence of fundamentally mindless things besides matter-energy in space-time (such as reified abstract objects).—Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs)

[edit] The mind is caused by natural phenomena

What all metaphysical naturalists agree on, however, is that the fundamental constituents of reality, from which everything derives and upon which everything depends, are fundamentally mindless. So if any variety of metaphysical naturalism is true, then any mental properties that exist (hence any mental powers or beings) are causally derived from, and ontologically dependent on, systems of nonmental properties, powers, or things. This means metaphysical naturalism would be false if any distinctly mental property, power, or entity exists that is not ontologically dependent on some arrangement of nonmental things, or that is not causally derived from some arrangement of nonmental things, or that has causal effects without the involvement of any arrangement of nonmental things that is already causally sufficient to produce that effect.

In lay terms, if metaphysical naturalism is true, then all minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely constructed from or caused by natural phenomena. If metaphysical naturalism is false, then some minds, or some of the contents or powers or effects of minds, are causally independent of nature (either they partly or wholly cause themselves, or they exist or operate fundamentally on their own).

Belief in the latter entails some form of supernaturalism (the opposite of naturalism), which is not limited to supernatural beings, but can encompass mindless things with distinctly mental properties, like magical objects (see magic and incantation) or causally efficacious Platonic forms or the existence of love as a cosmic force. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs)

[edit] Comments

All but two of the paragraphs in the Definition section is unsourced. Your choice to remove only ONE unsourced section and remove a section that actually is sourced by a neutral third party, reveals your bigoted POV. All your claims of neutrality are false. You choose to remove these only because you don't like them for they reveal facts you don't like.

The "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" is without question a reliable source. When it's philosophers declare that metaphysical naturalism is a "quasi-religion" then philosophers agree that metaphysical naturalism is a 'quasi-religion.' Non-philosophers such as your self may disagree, but that is irrelevant.

Either remove all unsourced paragraphs and leave the sourced ones or leave the paragraphs and find sources for or against them. You will find that the sections are quite accurate. After all, you like them, they stroke your religious beliefs. -- Christian Skeptic (talk) 17:57, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

Who are you replying to? If you have doubt about an unsourced section then remove it and explain your concern on the talk. If you have in-line WP:RS citations to re-insert the material that was removed then do so. Complaining will not change that. We66er (talk) 22:11, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

This section was not signed and I thought it was part of the one below. Turns out this is something I posted earlier so this is somewhat embarrasing. But it was not signed and signbot somehow missed it and I thought that you were wanting to revert the current section in the article back to this. Sorry about that.

Never-the-less, the point about all or nothing remains. Christian Skeptic (talk) 03:50, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

The fact the you added www.idthink.net as a source backed up why I removed the material. Please only use WP:RS in WP:CITE (As you know ID is a fringe view in academia.). We66er (talk) 22:06, 1 October 2008 (UTC)

The "Quasi-Religion" section is very strange. Christian Skeptic claims "good enough for SEP", but the term "quasi-religion" only appears in one essay by Alvin Plantinga, "Religion and Science"^[2]. At a minimum it should be attributed to Dr. Plantinga, not as a generally well-recognized definition. The main essays on naturalism at SEP do not contain similar comparisons. --24.61.149.8 (talk) 01:02, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Read the 3rd paragraph down from the heading in the article. That is the source for this paragraph. This is the opinion of the author of the SEP article, not just Plantinga. And others besides Plantinga are mentioned in the reference to quasi-religion in the first paragraph. This paragraph has good proper valid NPOV references. If you wish to rewrite the section to make it read easier, that's fine, but to delete it based on dislike, that is POV. Trabucogold (talk) 15:41, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Trabucogold: Plantinga is the author of the SEP essay "Religion and Science". Now that you know the author, do you still find the other cited references in the essay support good proper valid NPOV ? --24.61.149.8 (talk) 15:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Philosophers of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy feel that Plantinga's article is valid and of value, otherwise they would not have included it in their Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Plantinga didn't sneak it into the encyclopedia. SEP's main article on naturalism states "The term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy." So there is nothing there for which the philosophers of SEP would not include Plantinga . These guys are philosophers and as such know more about philosophy and naturalism than most editors on Wikipedia. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and all the articles in it, is a valid, reliable source for Wikipedia. If you don't like the fact that they include Plantina in their encyclopedia then complain to them and explain how his article is invalid because you disagree with his beliefs. It appears that you think you know better than the philosopher editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy which is good philosophy and which is not. What are your qualifications that trump those of these philosophers? Disagreeing with Plantinga is not a valid qualification.

There is no need to include Plantinga as author any more than the need to include any of the other authors of the other articles. SEP lists all of the authors at the bottom of the articles. In an encyclopedia, an article is included because the editors want it regardless of who the authors are. Trabucogold (talk) 16:44, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

One phrase in one article does not constitute a definition or justification for inclusion here. If this was a quasi religion there would be more references. --Snowded ^TALK 17:11, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

I think the SEP article makes a good point in this part of the article: There is that range of deep human questions to which a religion typically provides an answer (above, Section I): what is the fundamental nature of the universe: for example, is it mind first, or matter (non-mind) first? What is most real and basic in it, and what kinds of entities does it display? What is the place of human beings in the universe, and what is their relation to the rest of the world? Are there prospects for life after death? Is there such a thing as sin, or some analogue of sin? If so, what are the prospects of combating or overcoming it? Where must we look to improve the human condition? Is there such a thing as a summum bonum, a highest good for human beings, and if so what is it? Like a typical religion, naturalism gives a set of answers to these and similar questions. Naturalism and religion have these in common. And, according to the WP Religion article, a religion need not involve a diety, cathedrals, priests, etc. but simply be something that is believed with "zeal and conscientiousness" See religious belief. Thus it is possible for one to believe in naturalism religiously. 8teenfourT4 (talk) 17:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

⬅We have a clear problem here. I have just deleted again a paragraph which seeks to claim that this is a religion. It is based on one comment by an autor, it is not supported by any other references so it cannot stand as a statement about metaphysical naturalism as a whole. I am also concerned that we have a POV position here that is seeking to make science into religion - part of the whole creationist issue. --Snowded ^TALK 06:09, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

The fact that it is published in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy means that it is not just one man's opinion. It also represents the opinion of the editors of the SEP who chose to include the article in their encyclopedia. What you are doing is making yourself a judge above these trained philosophers. What expertise do you have in philosophy that makes you a better judge of philosophy than them? The SEP is not a creationist publication. It is about as neutral as you can get. I think you are charging windmills. You see spooks everywhere you look. The problem seems to be that you really don't understand philosophy and it's relationship to science. 8teenfourT4 (talk) 03:03, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

Snowed: Find some source that claims that this is wrong, then you may get some support for your position. otherwise it's just your opinion. MTDinoHunter (talk) 03:13, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

This is covered under WP:UNDUE. One paragraph, in one essay, does not qualify for NPOV. If there are other similar independent viewpoints, then it should be relatively easy to rewrite the section in question using those sources. From the SEP Editorial Policies [1] "The views expressed by the authors in their entries are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of Stanford University, the Stanford University Philosophy Department, the Encyclopedia's Editors or of anyone else associated with the Encyclopedia." 24.61.149.8 (talk) 14:59, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

Exactly, if it is the case there will be one that one example. --Snowded ^TALK 20:18, 6 November 2009 (UTC)

I have reversed the re-insertion of this material. The issue of the Stanford reference has been handled by several editors above, it does not support a section and statement about metaphysical naturalism. The more recent citation is a reference to religious naturalism, very little to do with a philosophy article. No evidence has been presented above to support the insertion, and the absence of any reference in the literature overall is clear. --Snowded ^TALK 05:58, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

The "Common beliefs" is very POV and lacks sources. For example, "do not and cannot come from science" and then it continues, "Evolution by natural selection or other means is a verity of the naturalist worldview." This whole section is POV and is without a single citation. Do not reinsert disputed material without sourcing it. We66er (talk) 15:38, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

The "common beliefs" section was here from the very beginning when this article was first put up. In fact, the original article read like it came from a single source, such as a humanist manifesto or some web page, but there was no reference. If "lack of sources" is a problem for "common beliefs" it is a problem for the entire article. If that is enough to cause the one to be removed, then the whole thing should be removed, but for the two paragraphs that are sourced. Never-the-less, the article does represent quite accurately what Metaphysics is and it's "logical consequences of core beliefs" as listed in the "common beliefs". Undefined eternal universe, deep time, abiogenesis, undesigned, unplanned life, evolution, mind as brain, utility of reason, value of society, and primacy of happiness are all logical consequences of naturalism and are typical in the various humanist manifestos that are deeply devoted to naturalism. A quick search can find a variety of pages that mention these points to varying degrees. However, most would not qualify as 3rd party neutral sources.

These 'common beliefs' are "logical consequences" (original wording, not mine) from the philosophy of metaphysical Naturalism. Naturalism is a philosophical belief that goes back at least to the era if the Greeks (see history section) thus it existed before the development of the scientific method and scientific knowledge acquired by it. Therefore metaphysical Naturalism cannot have come by scientific knowledge through the scientific method. It then follows that the "common beliefs" that are derived from Naturalism cannot have come from science. They are accepted, derived facts of Metaphysical Naturalism. Some claim that evolution has been proved by science, yet evolution is a verity of naturalism and did not come from science. The logic is inescapable. What may be in error are statements by perhaps well meaning but ill-informed persons. Christian Skeptic (talk) 17:24, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

If its not cited it can be removed. I have serious questions about the validity of that section. Further, if you can find WP:RS to reinsert the material then do so. Again, I am concerned about sources, not your opinions. We66er (talk) 22:07, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

the willy-nilly removal of sections is uncalled for. The usual method is to first put "fact" notices where needed, and then after editors have had time to find sources to fix things or not, then the parts can be removed. You are jumping the gun. Christian Skeptic (talk) 04:07, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

No, I doubt the material was relevant to the article. Anything without sources can be removed at any time. We66er (talk) 15:41, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

These sections were part of the original article when posted by Richard Carrier. and at web site [[2]] —Preceding unsigned comment added by Christian Skeptic (talk • contribs) 12:43, 1 October 2008 (UTC)

So? It needs sourced with WP:RS. We66er (talk) 22:05, 1 October 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Basic beliefs

The following indented section is not an attempt to criticize Metaphysical Naturalism. Rather, these very important statements are needed assumptions for Metaphysical Naturalism to be a valid. They were put in the Quasi-religion section because the acceptance of these quasi-religious beliefs is based upon pure logic, rather than the result of scientific experimentation. There is no scientific experiment that can show that the cosmos is all there is, this assumption actually comes first before one can do science. Repeatable scientific experiments cannot tell us that the Cosmos has ever been and ever will be. These are purely, philosophical requirements.

There is nothing wrong with these being philosophical realities. This is not a criticism at all, but an important clarification of the philosophical nature of Metaphysical Naturalism.

There may be a better way of explaining the nature of these important assumptions. But the fact that they are assumptions accepted as philosophical beliefs needs to be made manifest. This is nothing to be ashamed of. everyone starts with philosophical beliefs just to function from day to day, even if they may not realize it.

is all there is: In order to make this statement with surety someone must know everything there is to know about nature and the Cosmos. Else, it is an assumption based upon incomplete knowledge. This cannot come from the scientific method, for if everything were known that could be known there would be no need for the scientific method.

has ever been: In order to know this for certain someone must have existed for as long as nature has existed and communicated this point to us, else it is a statement of belief based on partial data.

ever will be: In order to make this assertion someone needs to know the future as well as the past and present, else it is a statement of belief. The scientific method cannot inform for it deals with but the repeatable present.

These three assertions are religious assumptions believed to be true. They must be true for metaphysical naturalism to be true. --Christian Skeptic (talk) 15:01, 11 October 2008 (UTC)

The above is a discussion about if these paragraphs should or should not be in the article. The claim for their removal was that they were a criticism of Metaphysical Naturalism and in the wrong part of the article. There was no discussion about if these were a POV. These paragraphs are not a criticism of Metaphysical Naturalism. They definitely are NOT POV! They simply illustrate, as discussed above and in the article, the philosophical nature of Metaphysical Naturalism's beliefs. As anyone can see, Sagan's definition on metaphysical naturalism is not based on science, because science cannot prove or even approach any of the three main parts of the definition. Therefore, the three points must be philosophical assumptions.

If someone takes issue with these points and what I've pointed out let then explain why they think so. please explain or provide sources that explain the role science has to play with Metaphysical Naturalism. Show that they are POV. Or where they should be put in the article. Willi-nilly censorship come from fear. Christian Skeptic (talk) 19:10, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

Any sources? We66er (talk) 22:47, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

Citatation was needed for the section about Marxism that included Objectivism. I deleted references to Objectivism because naturalism, denying that such entities as "mind", "soul", and "ego" are metaphysical existents, [see Dennett; centerfornaturalism.org; etc.] is opposed to Objectivism. Its founder, Ayn Rand, specifically valued egoism, the mind, and talked about "spiritualism" probably more than any atheist. Chapter 11 of "Anthem" is entirely devoted to the spiritualism of "self" and "ego". Dennett, et. al., deny the concept of the "self-made man", whereas Rand equated it with what President Reagan would later call "rugged individualism." Any number of references in Objectivist literature will uphold my opinion. If you disagree, please confer with me first and I'll provide those references.

I am as disappointed about sections of all the "naturalist" pages, but I'm having a hard time inserting material. It gets deleted immediately, and I've been told why. So I'm trying to rework some of my writing to fit the suggestions made to me. I do feel entirely justified deleting the references to Objectivism. Metaphysicalnaturalist (talk) 20:13, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

I find some of the wording here to be very opaque and indeed misleading.

The very first sentence says: Metaphysical or ontological naturalism is any worldview in which the world is amenable to a unified study that includes the natural sciences and in this sense the world is a unity. This statement is wrong, because idealistic theism too is a worldview in which the world is amenable to a unified study that includes the natural sciences and in this sense the world is a unity. It seems to me that what characterizes ontological naturalism is that reality is ultimately mechanical, or alternatively, that that reality can ultimately be understood or described using only mechanical principles. That's the basic idea, and it should be explicit in the introduction.

In the definition section it says: metaphysical naturalism refers to a belief about the totality of what exists, excluding by definition gods, spirits, and any other supernatural beings, objects, or forces. Now suppose one is a theist and believes in gods, would that person be justified to call herself a "metaphysical naturalist"? Of course not, but that's what this definition implies. It's not "metaphysical naturalism" that refers to a belief about the totality of what exists (including perhaps gods, etc), but "metaphysics" itself. Dianelos (talk) 11:08, 24 November 2008 (UTC)

Metaphysical Naturalism has always excluded anything and everything "supernatural". That is what Metaphysical Naturalism is all about. Carl Sagan's statement implies that and all philosophers of science point this out. For those who want to believe in a god, Methodological Naturalism was devised which allows for the possibility of 'supernatural' beings and involvement. Idealistic Theism is similar to Metaphysical/ontological naturalism in that they are world views amenable to unified study, but Metaphysical naturalism denies any supernatural involvement in it's mechanistic or naturalistic principles. Christian Skeptic (talk) 16:48, 24 November 2008 (UTC)

So I take it we agree that, as both ontological naturalism and idealistic theism satisfy the predicate of the very sentence of this article, that sentence is wrong. Further to define naturalism in terms of supernaturalism does not work because it simply shifts the problem to how to define supernaturalism. You may say that supernaturalism is characterized by miracles, but, again, how do you define what a miracle is before defining how naturalistic reality is supposed to be and then pointing out that miracles are such as to violate that state? Unless we define what naturalism itself is supposed to say, we leave a circularity in the very definition of the concept which this article is about. Do you see any problem in defining ontological naturalism as the thesis that reality can ultimately and exhaustively be described on mechanical principles ("mechanical" meaning "amenable to an algorithmic expression") Dianelos (talk) 08:35, 25 November 2008 (UTC)

I guess I'd like to see what you are thinking. Perhaps if you would go ahead and write here how you think it should be would help. Christian Skeptic (talk) 01:57, 26 November 2008 (UTC)

What about:

Metaphysical or ontological naturalism characterizes any worldview in which reality is such that there is nothing but the natural things, forces, and causes or the kind that the natural sciences study, i.e. the things, forces and causes which are required in order to understand our physical environment and which have mechanical properties amenable to mathematical modeling. Metaphysical naturalism entails that all concepts related to consciousness or to the mind refer to entities which are reducible to or supervene on such natural things, forces and causes. More specifically metaphysical naturalism rejects the objective existence of any supernatural thing, force or cause, such as are described in humanity’s various religions and mythological accounts. Metaphysical naturalism is a monistic and not a dualistic view of reality.

In practice the use of the term metaphysical naturalism reduces to the more specific ontological view of “scientific naturalism”, according to which reality consists only of what the concepts of the natural sciences (and especially physics) refer to. Scientific naturalism is closely related to physicalism.

Metaphysical naturalism represents a particular view about reality and hence belongs to the philosophical field of ontology. As such it should not be confused with the related but distinct “methodological naturalism” which represents a particular view of how one should think about reality and which hence belongs to the philosophical field of epistemology.

Dianelos (talk) 20:05, 27 November 2008 (UTC)

I put your intro into the main text with some minor modification. Christian Skeptic (talk) 08:58, 10 January 2009 (UTC)

Recently, there has been the insertion of obvious WP:OR, as well as massive deletions of existing material. I think we need to stop and talk this over first. Spotfixer (talk) 18:55, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

The only bad change was the one to delete a sourced "argument against." There is no evidence that it is OR. It is just new and you don't like it which is not a valid reason to delete it.

Almost all arguments for and against are unsourced and are OR. If you are going to remove something for not being sourced, then EVERYTHING that is not sourced in the article needs to be removed. It doesn't matter how long it has been in the article.

And to undo the wikifying of the references is completely irrational! Trabucogold (talk) 19:10, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

When a change includes massive deletions plus one or two minor improvements, reverting the deletions matters more than evaluating the possible value of the minor changes. That's why it's entirely acceptable to revert the entire change.

Keep in mind that someone adding text has the burden of showing that it's relevant, high quality and reliably sourced. If there's any doubt at all, it gets reverted. On the other hand, if you have doubts about existing text, the right move is to add templates to indicate a need for changes, or to make some of those careful changes yourself. Massive deletion to make a WP:POINT is unacceptable. Spotfixer (talk) 19:20, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

I have just looked over the article and am not ready to comment on this specific dispute but I see another major problem and I would suggest that it needs to be addressed first - once it has been addressed, it may be easier to resolve or at least assess the current dispute. here is the problem: while the article provides sources, the text of the article does not provide enough context. Who first coined the phrase, "metaphysical naturalism?" Whoever coined it, was she proposing her own view, or using this to describe a view currently held, or held in the past, by others? Whom did she give as examples of people holding this view? How was her arguments received by her peers? By others? Also, how does this phrase circulate today? Is it used by philosophers, scientists, or non-academics? Is it a mainstream view among any group of people? Who, and how do we know? I am asking for facts, and my point is that the article as a whole is vague about these things and oughtn't to be. One part of NPOV compliance is clearly identifying whose view, and contextualizing it. Clarify these points, and I think it will then be possible to address other contentious points more easily and constructively. Currently, the whole historical section to me reads like OR and it seems very anachronistic. Do all intellectual historians or historians of philosophy agree with this? Which intellectual historians or historians of philosophy make these claims? I am not just curious to know what popular authors like Will Durant or Bertrand Russell claimed - I want to have an idea of what current scholarship, the kind found in peer-reviewed journal articles, is. Does Dawkins use the phrase "metaphysical naturalism?" Did marx? Did Rand? Otherwise, isn't this all OR? Slrubenstein | Talk 20:24, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

To put this in context, there is an attempt by Creationists to claim that science is under the thrall of a "religious" concept known as metaphysical naturalism. The idea here is to equate science with religious so that the latter can get equal time in the classroom. Spotfixer (talk) 04:28, 12 January 2009 (UTC)

I know the context. My point is that all articles are vulnerable when they do not comply fully to our policies. Forget about the motives, intentions, agenda of other editors and just insist that an article comply with WP:NPOV, WP:V, and WP:NOR. Are you saying it is not possible for this article to comply with those policies? If so, nominate it for deletion. Otherwise, work on making it comply with our policies. I just indicated a number of important areas where it needs work, and I suggested specific factual information that is required for this article to be compliant. It is reasonable to give people who have worked on this article some time to provide that information. If they cannot, OR or none-NPOV material I refer to can just be deleted. Slrubenstein | Talk 14:51, 12 January 2009 (UTC)

I don't know that we disagree. This article is a mess today, but it's certainly possible for it to be fixed; the topic of metaphysical naturalism is substantial enough for something better. I don't think we can let ourselves forget about the context here anymore than we can on evolution, but it certainly shouldn't be our focus. Our focus should be on making the article neutral and verifiable, as you said. Spotfixer (talk) 00:28, 13 January 2009 (UTC)

My study into this field indicates that there has been little put out about the development of Metaphysical Naturalism. It is something that is just accepted. Look at the sources, especially the Philosophy links. Most of the questions you want answers to will reqire a lot of OR just to find. My feeling on this is that it is primarily philosophers who deal with this even though it is the foundation of science. Most scientists I've met and talked with, do not really look into the assumptions they make and where they come from in order to do science. As one of the references in the article states most of us just accept what ever 'everyone else' uses without really examining the philosophy behind it all. I've been adding what I've found on the topic, but there is a void of knowledge about this out there. It is enlightening to go back and read the artical as first written couple years ago, and go to the web site of the original author--a philosopher who has written some books and articles on the topic. Christian Skeptic (talk) 06:22, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

As the section "Science and Metaphysical Naturalism" (MN) indicates science is based upon MN and a previous section notes that evolution is a logical consequence of MN, then it does not seem logical for the validity of MN to be proved by science or evolution. That would be the fallacy of trying to prove one's assumption. Perhaps both of these sections ought to be revised to exclude scientific or evolutionary reasons. Purely logical reasons may well be valid. Christian Skeptic (talk) 14:51, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

You said '"Mind caused by Natural Phenomena" seems better suited under "common beliefs"'. This makes no sense, so I fixed it. You keep breaking it. Stop. TruthIIPower (talk) 03:19, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

Explain what you mean. Just saying "it makes no sense" is no argument. I grouped common elements. The section on the "mind" was out of place where it was. It has no commonality with: Definition, Quasi-religion, Physicalism & pluralism, Relationship of metaphysical & methodological naturalism, Distinguishing metaphysical & methodological naturalism, and Science and Metaphysical Naturalism. But it does have a common theme with: Mind as brain, Utility of reason. I explained this when I moved it. Christian Skeptic (talk) 06:21, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

If you believe it makes sense, go ahead and show how, using reliable sources instead of your personal opinion. If you can't then what choice do I have but to remove your unsourced statements? TruthIIPower (talk) 23:51, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

Go back and look at the history of this article. Originally, it was completely unsourced and the result of one man's OR -- he is a philosopher who has written books on the topic. I have been adding sources, rewriting, and reorganizing it in small steps for some time. This last move put everything about the mind and brain into direct association. It's not perfect but a step in the right direction. As I explained before, it was out of place where it had been. Christian Skeptic (talk) 02:26, 10 April 2009 (UTC)

Deleted some unsourced "against" paragraphs which sounded to me like someone using weasel words to hide the fact he was basically just writing his opinion. Most them were ignorant of science and/or metaphysical naturalism, anyway. 66.57.44.247 (talk) 09:46, 7 June 2009 (UTC)

Article states "is a variety of the argument from despair already noted above" and links to a section which no longer exists. Could someone rephrase that sentence, or restore the section? I am not familiar enough with the history of this article to decide which course of action is best. Thanks.-Andrew c ^[talk] 21:05, 17 June 2009 (UTC)

"To date, nothing that is not physical has ever been discovered, and so metaphysical naturalism remains a valid position based upon what is currently known."

I don't know if this is quite right. Shouldn't it be "To date, there is no scientifically verifiable evidence of anything non-physical, and so..." That is to say, "Although there have been many claims from various whackjobs about ghosts and miracles, no one has ever produced a picture of a ghost or a Mary statue crying blood that couldn't have been faked." Corbmobile (talk) 07:43, 13 October 2009 (UTC)

There are numerous issues with this article, beginning with the Definition section. For example, the description of naturalists as "apologists for naturalism," suggests that whoever wrote the section does not agree with naturalism. Another issue is with the poorly sourced and inconsistent sections (including, for example, "Absolute vs. Contingent methodological naturalism," which is not sourced and misidentifies the topic, i.e., methodological rather than metaphysical), most especially the History section, which is virtually entirely unsourced. I plan on making some changes, but due to limited time cannot undertake a thorough review/edit. This article needs a lot of work. Jcsam70 (talk) 03:55, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

Just a note. One does not need to agree with naturalism to write the article. In fact, it borders on POV for only those who agree with it to be the ones to write about it. I agree that the article needs much work. If you go back and read up on the history that sort of explains how it got where it is. WebEdHC (talk) 04:44, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

I do apologize for the possible tone of my previous entry. Of course one does not need to agree, and I did not mean to imply that an individual should. The intent was merely to note this as one of many problems. I have gone ahead and edited the Definition and Epistemology sections, the latter being heavily redacted due to the fact that the formulation of an epistemology is not a part of metaphysical naturalism. Rather, it is dependent on an existent epistemology. Jcsam70 (talk) 05:50, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

On Methodological naturalism (MdN): (I've been concerned with it's page also) the issue is that science depends upon a philosophy in order to function. The way the definition reads it seems that MdN is not a foundation for science, when it is in fact. Thus it reads confusing. Trabucogold (talk) 17:42, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

I modified it somewhat to clear up the confusion (I hope). Of course, there is an emphasis on defining the topic -- metaphysical as opposed to methodological naturalism. Jcsam70 (talk) 22:51, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

[edit] Edits

The Definition and Epistemology sections have been modified as far as I am able at this point. I hope they are met with approval. Jcsam70 (talk) 00:02, 28 November 2009 (UTC)

on the whole, I approve the new edits. I do have one small concern. under Epistemology it says this: "it is usually expressed via methodological naturalism (i.e., science)." This equates philosophy with science which conflicts with the section below called: "Science and metaphysical naturalism" which explains the distinction between philosophy and the science based on it. MTDinoHunter (talk) 20:39, 28 November 2009 (UTC)

I see what you're saying. However, I also think there's a lot of confusion surrounding the difference between methodological naturalism, which is a research philosophy (i.e., an epistemology), and metaphysical naturalism, which is usually considered a logical consequence or philosophical conclusion derived from the findings of science rather than an influence thereon. In other words, science can certainly be done without metaphysical naturalism, but arguably not without methodological naturalism. In light of this, I think that further edits of the article in general will serve to clear things up. What do you think? Jcsam70 (talk) 22:40, 28 November 2009 (UTC)

I've understood that Metaphysical Naturalism (MpN) provides the foundation for the scientific method to be done. For instance, the proposition that "the cosmos (i.e. nature) is all there is" (per Sagan) is a statement that science cannot prove or disprove. How could one even set up a hypothesis that could test that nature is all there is? Could you scientifically falsify such a proposition by proving that something other than nature exists or that there is a supernatural? It's impossible. Such a proposition is an assumption about nature that allows for science to be done rather than being the results of scientific research.

Gould talks about philosophical assumptions that must be made before one can do science (in "Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle") such as the Uniformity of Laws and Processes. These too, are MpN assumptions that cannot come from science. The scientific method is not the end all in acquiring knowledge. To even do the scientific method, philosophical assumptions must be made about nature first. And logically, these assumptions cannot even be tested by science. To try to do so would be to commit the logical fallacy of trying to prove ones assumptions. It seems to me we want to logically consistent. MTDinoHunter (talk) 02:52, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

The distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism is important, the former does not require the latter which is what is important for the this article. Any debate about assumptions, testability. the limits of science etc are valid material for appropriate articles. --Snowded ^TALK 07:28, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

I read MTDinohunter carfully. I don't see any debate about limits of science. However, he does show that Metaphysical Naturalism cannot come from science. Rather it is the other way around. Philosophy comes first. Even Stephen Gould makes that point in the book mentioned above. (Its a really good read on this topic.) And I find it curious that some want to put a great distance between Metaphysical and Philosophical Naturalism, when there is really very little difference between them.

Also, he seems to be showing that there is a logical distinction between philosophy and science, i.e. between Methodological Naturalism and science. But the article appears to state that Methodological Naturalism is science--"it is usually expressed via methodological naturalism (i.e., science)." Perhaps the sentence could be written: "it is usually expressed via methodological naturalism as a basis for science." Trabucogold (talk) 14:48, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Well that's a point of view. --Snowded ^TALK 19:57, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Snowded is quite right. MpN (metaphysical naturalism) is separate from MdN (methodological naturalism). The latter is essential for science, while the former most definitely is not. The confusion stems, I think, from the fact that each is a philosophy. Yet where MpN is a philosophy concerning what exists (i.e., an ontology), MdN is a philosophy concerning research methods (i.e., an epistemology). In other words, MpN is assertive, while MdN is investigative. Jcsam70 (talk) 02:07, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

So. MpN states that "Nature is all there is, has ever been or ever will be". There is nothing else but nature (i.e. no supernatural) so the only explanations that can exist are natural explanations.

MdN states that the only possible explanations are those that are natural. (no supernatural explanations need apply). So, in effect there is nothing else but nature.

It seems to me that anyone who accepts MpN will automatically accept MdN. And one who accepts MdN would find it illogical to consider anything else but MpN. Logically, MpN is the basis for MdN. MpN and MdN go hand in hand and the distinction between the two is largely semantic: 'ontologic' vs 'epistologic'.

So, why is there so much effort in making them out to be so different? The starting point is the same: Nature is all there is, has ever been or ever will be. 8teenfourT4 (talk) 15:03, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

The distinction is simply that one is an ontology while the other is a methodology. That there is a relationship between them is not in dispute, but it would be inappropriate to characterize them as basically the same, particularly in the context of an encyclopedia article. Maybe someone could write a section specifically arguing their similarities, but I'm personally not inclined to do so. Not because I don't recognize the relationship (I was at pains to ensure their close relationship was noted; See the #Epistemology section), but because I doubt it would be fruitful. Jcsam70 (talk) 01:20, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

A further edit I just did to the #Definition section will hopefully settle the matter of the difference between method and metaphysics. Please review and advise. Thanks. Jcsam70 (talk) 02:48, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

I applaud the work you've been doing. keep it up. I may not agree with everything and will say so, but over all the article is looking better. WebEdHC (talk) 20:56, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

Perhaps a section ought to be added about the basis for the idea that "nature is all there is, has ever been or ever will be." What led to this philosophical position? and perhaps something else about why MpN is important. Or, Where does this idea lead. 8teenfourT4 (talk) 22:08, 1 December 2009 (UTC)

I would think that could be covered in the history section. If, however, such a thing is called for it'd have to be written carefully so as to avoid debating the validity (or lack thereof). As for why MpN is important or where does it lead, I agree that a "Consequences" section (or something like that) might be appropriate, if worded carefully. NOTE: I've said twice that care should be taken only because this article still needs a good bit of help. Jcsam70 (talk) 01:26, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

I just reverted an extended edit by 173.55.80.176 that appeared to slant much of the article toward a particular view, that of Dennis Polis. While it was obviously a good-faith edit and clearly represented a lot of work on some anonymous editor's part, it appeared to violate NPOV, so I reverted it. Any other opinions on this? Agathman (talk) 19:56, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

I thought about reverting, but overall thought it was an improvement. I did wonder if the editor was linked to Polis in some way. That said I am personally sympathetic to a Thomist position here. Overall the editor made a series of informed comments to several articles from scratch. I would be more comfortable if it was not an IP. Personally I would suggest reinstating the changes but toning them down a bit. --Snowded ^TALK 20:02, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

Okay, I went back and did some editing. I'm still a bit uncomfortable with the format in later sections, where each argument from naturalism is followed by a refutation, and I think the whole article would benefit from a lot more citations, both pro and anti - naturalism. Agathman (talk) 20:53, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, its nice to see someone putting some effort in though! --Snowded ^TALK 21:28, 4 January 2010 (UTC)

It is quite clear that this article was written by a believer. The "arguments" section is particulary bad in the sense that it lists very weak arguments in the "against" sub-section. The arguments "for" contain no citations whatsoever, but when I recently tried to add a strong argument "against", equally without citation, it was promptly removed. This is ludicrous. Either allow both, or none at all. If I don't see reliable sources added to that section in short order, it is only fair to wipe it out completely. As a philosopher, there is nothing more repugnant to me than a group of individuals who cannot stand to put the best argumentation forward, both for and against. It is the only way to procede in philosophy. A belief system which cannot withstand a proper debate is not worth believing in the first place. Sylvanius 16:05, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

As far as I can see you added a large body of text without a single citation so you should expect it to be reverted. That said hardly anything in this article is referenced. Its not clear to me that it is even a valid topic. Maybe its time to delete it?--Snowded ^TALK 17:33, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

The article describes Intelligent Design as legally unscientific. This is bizarre on several levels. For one thing this article is about philosophy not science, and arguments do not have to be scientific. Further the claim is based on US law which should not be privileged above other legal systems. (I can imagine Iranian law having a different opinion.) Finally it is not clear that it matters at all whether the law views the theory as unscientific. I will delete this description. —Preceding unsigned comment added by MathHisSci (talk • contribs) 15:34, 2 April 2010 (UTC)

At the top of this page, Wildbot points out that the "primacy" link in "(see Value of society and Primacy of happiness below)" is broken (section Metaphysical naturalism#Evolution).

That is because this edit (Dec 2008) removed the "Primacy of happiness" section (search for "primacy" on this talk page). I suppose the link should just be removed? Johnuniq (talk) 01:31, 30 April 2010 (UTC)

The section on "Mind as brain" claims that the "Causal Closure" paradigm has been falsified. However, the reference material points to http://xianphil.org/testing_cc.html and doesn't support this and neglects to take into consideration that parts of the brain can change the chemistry of other parts. It's taken from a book that isn't a scientific text and is isn't accepted as part of scientific literature.

Moreover, the site on which the article is hosted has this on the front page:

"Open philosophy is an approach that combines science with traditional wisdom to build a truly inclusive worldview. Dr. Dennis F. Polis is a Catholic Philosopher-Physicist and is available to speak on the challenges science poses to the religious worldview."

Hardly seems a credible source. The section that says Causal Closure has been falsified needs to go ASAP.Bhagwad (talk) 12:36, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

the sentence "However, the existences of multiverses with variant physical constants and natural laws, which is required to support the antropic principle counterargument the is completely unsupported by any scientific data, and violates the empirical principles on which naturalism is supposed to be based." is just counter-factual.

It insinuates that the multiverse violates Occam's razor, but OR is meant to clean up hypothesis. If something exists, it can not be shaved off. If this were the case, then sub-atomic particles would violate OR. Also, many physicists believe there is a ton of evidence, predictions in relation to the multiverse. Edward Witten, Andrei Linde, Michio Kaku, Leonard Susskind, Brian Greene, Stephen Hawking, Sean Carroll, Steven Weinberg are just a few of the massive amount of physicists that support it. Eightbitlegend (talk) 23:29, 11 June 2010 (UTC)